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1. Introduction
During the past decade, the liabilities of securities professionals have
escalated markedly under the federal securities laws. This article surveys the
theories underlying the imposition of such legal liabilities and the principal
types of liabilities, focusing on the securities professional qua professional,
providing services to clients. The discussion treats the liabilities of lawyers,
accountants, underwriters, broker-dealers, and investment advisers, acting in
their professional capacities. It does not extend to securities professionals
serving as corporate directors or selling securities for their own accounts.
The most noteworthy trend in professionals' responsibilities under the
federal securities laws has been the dramatic increase in actions against lawyers
and accountants, whose express statutory liabilities are more limited than those
of other securities professionals. Since the early 1970s, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) has instituted over 120 discriplinary cases against
lawyers under SEC rule 2(e) [1], while less than ten such cases were instituted
prior to 1970 [2]. This geometric increase in the number of SEC disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers has occurred despite the creation by the American
Bar Association of a Committee on Counsel Responsibility and Liability,
which is active today [3]. Evidence that accountants are increasingly subject to
liability for their activities as securities professionals is found in the nearly 100
Accounting Series Releases relating to enforcement actions against 135
accounting firms and practitioners [4]. The great majority of these were issued
by the SEC after 1970.
This marked expansion of the liabilities of securities professionals applies to
firms as well as to individual practitioners. Major law and accounting firms
have been respondents in SEC enforcement actions. In fact, almost all of the
large accounting firms have been named in SEC disciplinary proceedings [5].
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2. Theories underlying the legal liabilities of securities professionals
Before examining types of legal liabilities to which securities professionals
are subject, one must ask why securities professionals are increasingly targeted
by the SEC and private litigants to bear responsibility for questionable
securities transactions. What are the theories for imposing legal liabilities on
these non-principals in securities transactions? In theory, it is possible simply
to impose legal responsibilities on the clients of securities professionals and to
define the scope of professionals' responsibilities through contracts between
the clients and the securities professionals. United States law has progressed on
a different path, moving beyond a contract theory of professional responsibil-
ity. The theories that appear to have guided federal law on its current path
include: (1) the "access" or "passkey" theory; (2) the "super fiduciary"
theory; and (3) the "source of money" theory [6].
2.1. "Access" or "passkey" theory
The fundamental assumption of the "access" or "passkey" theory 17] is that
securities professionals control entry to the capital markets. Securities profes-
sionals supply the "passkey" to the markets through their role in providing
services and advice to principals in securities transactions. They are therefore
obliged to assure that the markets remain fair and orderly.
The seminal case for the access theory involved a criminal prosecution of an
accountant and a lawyer charged with engaging in a conspiracy to sell
unregistered securities and to defraud investors. In United States V. Benjamin
[8), federal court of appeals Judge Henry J. Friendly remarked: "In our
complex society the accountant's certificate and the lawyer's opinion can be
instruments for inflicting pecuniary loss more potent than the chisel or the
crowbar" [9]. Although the SEC has embraced Judge Friendly's statement as
the cornerstone of the "access" theory, the theory has been developing for
some time. As early as the 1950s, the SEC instituted administrative proceed-
ings, including a 2(e) disciplinary proceeding, against a United States lawyer
who had given a legal opinion to a Canadian lawyer and a Canadian promoter
regarding sales within the United States of unregistered Canadian corporate
stocks that were allegedly free from registration requirements [10].
The "access" theory has developed into a comprehensive theory of liability.
In its most extreme form, it posits that securities professionals are in a better
position to prevent abuses than anyone else. In the technically complex capital
markets, securities professionals are the only participants able to regulate
market access. As holders of the "passkey" to the markets, these professionals
are able either to prevent the "bad guy" from entering the markets or to make
certain that all potential problems are fully disclosed. In other words, this is
the most efficient point on which to put enforcement pressure.
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Why must the role of the lawyer as independent guardian of the gates of the
capital markets be legally prescribed? Is it not reasonable to expect securities
professionals to assume this role as a natural outgrowth of enlightened
self-interest? Another aspect of the "access" theory provides the answer.
Capital markets constitute a valuable resource which may be disrupted if
investor confidence is undermined. A few scandals have the potential to wreak
incalculable losses. In essence capital markets are a type of public good. The
government is unwilling to entrust the fate of the these markets to individual
securities professionals, because the social cost of even a few irresponsible
decisions with respect to fraudulent transactions is potentially too great for the
risk of unguided private regulation.
2.2. "Super fiduciary" theory
A second theory of liablity can be denominated the "super fiduciary"
theory. On the one hand, the theory is anchored to the notion that securities
professionals owe fiduciary duties to their clients in addition to their contract-
ual duties. Thus, under this theory a lawyer or investment banker may not
relieve himself of all responsibility for a securities offering through the con-
tract. Nor is it possible by contract to require customers of broker-dealers to
arbitrate rather than prosecute their claims in court.
This theory can be explained, in part, by a concern about the disparity in
expertise between clients and securities professionals. Nevertheless, even
sophisticated clients will not be bound by contractual provisions that totally
exculpate professionals. At the same time, however, the "siper fiduciary"
theory rests on the premise that the securities professional owes a duty to the
government. Here the "super fiduciary" theory seems to intersect with the
"access" theory. Under both the "access' and the "super fiduciary" theories
the lawyer is more akin to the independent "ombudsman" than the advocate.
The duty of the lawyer to take steps promptly to end the client's noncom-
pliance with the federal securities laws supplants the duty to maintain client
confidentiality. The lawyer's "police" functions [11] might include going to the
board of directors (the "duty to seek higher authority" within the corporate
structure) or public disclosure (the duty to "blow the whistle").
A conflict exists between the two types of fiduciary duty - to the client and
to the public. Members of the securities bar are acutely aware of this conflict.
2.3. "Source of money" theory
The third theory for imposing liabilities on securities professionals is simply
that they are excellent sources of money. This theory finds its primary
application in private damage actions.
The "source of money" theory is grounded in practicality, not in law. First,
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securities professionals are often the surviving "deep pockets" when clients
have gone bankrupt or have left the jurisdiction. In such situations, courts
sometimes look to the securities professionals to reimburse a plaintiff who has
clearly suffered a legal wrong from someone. This theory is also based on the
recognition that securities professionals may be good risk spreaders. An
investment bank or law firm that pays large money damages is likely to
purchase insurance against monetary damages. The cost of premiums will be
spread among all customers of the firms. In effect, the professional is spreading
the risk of an insolvent or unreachable client among all its clients.
3. Principal types of legal liabilities
3.1. Secondary liability: Aiding and abetting
The common law doctrine of aiding and abetting [12] has been a major
source of secondary liability [13] for securities professionals. Without explicit
statutory mandate [14], aiding and abetting liability has been judicially and
administratively grafted onto sections of the securities laws, principally the
antifraud provisions [15], thereby expanding the scope of professionals' re-
sponsibilities.
Aiding and abetting liability is part of the common law of torts. Following
the lead of Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance Co. [ 161, courts have
repeatedly invoked the Restatement of Torts when establishing this form of
secondary liability [17]. Section 876 of the Restatement provides in part: "For
harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, a person
is liable if he... (b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty
and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct
himself..." [18].
The principles of the Restatement have been reformulated by the United
States courts of appeals in securities cases; a consensus now exists regarding
the elements that constitute aiding and abetting. The courts generally require:
(1) proof of an independent wrong, i.e. a securities law violation by a primary
violator; (2) proof that the alleged aider-abettor knew of the violation and of
his own role in the illegal activity; and (3) proof that the alleged aider-abettor
knowingly and substantially assisted in the violation [19].
Proof of the independent wrong presents no difficulty in most aiding and
abetting cases. The courts differ, however, on the standards of proof required
to satisfy the second and third elements of liability: the state of mind necessary
for the imposition of liability and the extent to which liability must be based
upon affirmative action as opposed to silence and inaction.
Although proof of scienter [20] is required for a finding of aiding and
abetting liability regardless of whether or not such proof is a condition
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precedent to the imposition of primary liability under the particular statutory
provision [21], the courts are divided on whether recklessness may satisfy the
scienter requirement. The Supreme Court has reserved judgment on the issue in
the primary liability context [221. In secondary liability cases, some federal
courts of appeals have required a finding that the defendant was aware that he
was assisting in the primary violation [231. Other courts of appeals have held
that recklessness is sufficient to meet the scienter element [24]. Still other
courts have developed a standard that combines the above approaches by
positing a sliding scale of scienter. Under this mixed approach, a showing of
recklnessness will satisfy the scienter requirement where the alleged
aider-abettor owes a direct fiduciary duty to the defrauded party [25], but
"[s]omething closer to an actual intent to aid in the fraud" is necessary in an
aiding and abetting context where no fiduciary relationship is involved [26].
Another unresolved question is whether silence and inaction satisfy the third
element of aiding and abetting liability - knowing and substantial assistance in
the primary violation. The Supreme Court has yet to address this issue. The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has declined to adopt the inaction
theory, holding that mere inaction can never give rise to liability for aiding and
abetting a violation of rule lOb-5 [27].
Other courts have been willing to impose liability for inaction where there is
either a separate duty to act or a higher degree of scienter. In SEC v. National
Student Marketing Corp. [28], the district court found that the attorney-defen-
dants aided and abetted violations of antifraud provisions when they breached
a duty to disclose material information to the shareholders of their corporate
client [29]. Alternatively, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
emphasized the importance of scienter when an aiding and abetting claim is
based on the defendant's inaction. That court stated in Rochez Brothers, Inc. v.
Rhoades: "Inaction may be a form of assistance, but only where the plaintiff is
able to show that the silence of the aider-abettor was consciously intended to
aid the securities law violation" [30].
Other courts combine the approaches of National Student Marketing and
Rochez Brothers and posit a dual standard for aiding and abetting liability
where silence and inaction are involved. This standard, first articulated in
Woodward v. Metro Bank [31], was recently adopted by the SEC in In re Carter
& Johnson: "When it is impossible to find any duty of disclosure, an aider and
abettor should be found liable only if scienter of the high 'conscious intent'
variety can be found. Where some special duty of disclosure exists, then
liability should be possible with a lesser degree of scienter" [32].
Securities professionals have been increasingly drawn into securities litiga-
tion under the aiding and abetting doctrine. The Supreme Court has never
expressly considered whether aiding and abetting liability is a valid theory
under the securities laws [33], and there are indications that the Court may
tighten the reins on secondary liability [34].
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
272 T.S. Lodge, D.J. McCauley, Jr. / Liabilities of securities professionals in the U.S.
One commentator has argued that the recent restrictive approach of the
Supreme Court towards the availability of implied private damage remedies in
securities cases indicates that, if confronted with the issue today, the Court
would not recognize the validity of secondary liability theories [35]. Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redinglon [36] and Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis [37] hold that no implied remedies are available in the absence of
affirmative evidence that Congress intended such remedies. Congressional
intent must therefore define the scope of liability. "If tort l.aw cannot provide a
basis for implying a remedy [to expressly proscribed conduct], it necessarily
follows that it cannot, without more, be used to redefine the scope of conduct
prohibited by statute" [38]. Looking to the statutory framework of the securi-
ties acts and in particular to the provisions expressly imposing secondary
liability [39], the commentator concludes that Congress did not intend to
expand liability through application of the aiding and abetting theory.
Despite the concerns articulated above, the Supreme Court is not likely to
negate secondary liability. As recently as spring 1982, the Supreme Court
moderated its restrictive approach towards implied rights of action. In Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran [40], the Court held that where the
comprehensive re-examination and significant amendment of a statute left
intact the statutory provisions under which the federal courts had routinely
and consistently implied a cause of action, such legislative action is itself
evidence that Congress affirmatively intended to preserve the remedy. It is
arguable that Congress' failure to forbid aiding and abetting liability when it
extensively amended the securities laws in 1975 implies its endorsement of such
liability.
3.2. Express liabilities
3.2.1. Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933
A specified group of securities professionals is expressly liable to purchasers
of securities.under the Securities Act of 1933 [41]. This class is more narrowly
defined than the class of individuals subject to secondary liability under the
aiding and abetting theory. Section 11 [42], which establishes civil liabilities for
material misstatements or omissions in a registration statement, is unique
among other express liability provisions of the securities laws because of its
specific designation of persons who may be liable for violations of the Act and
because of its elaborate statement of defenses afforded those persons.
Section 11 provides a right of action to any person who acquires a security
issued in an offering covered by a defective registration statement [43]. The
purchaser need only prove that at the time the registration statement became
effective, it "contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to
state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the
statements therein not misleading" [44]. Thus, the purchaser is not required to
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establish reliance on the misstatement or omission, except where the security is
acquired "after the issuer has made generally available to its security holders
an earning statement covering a period of at least twelve months beginning
after the effective date of the registration statement" [45]. Nor is it necessary to
prove scienter on the part of the defendants. This absolute liability provided by
Section 11 (a) is tempered by the "due diligence" defenses afforded by Section
1 l(b) that in effect impose a negligence standard of liability [46], except in the
case of an issuer-defendant, who is always absolutely liable.
The test of materiality, the heart of a Section II claim [47], has been defined
in the abstract, though it may prove difficult to apply in practice. SEC rule 405
defines material facts as "those matters as to which an average prudent
investor ought reasonably to be informed before purchasing the security
registered" [48]. The Supreme Court stated the test of materiality to be applied
to a proxy statement in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.:
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would
consider it important in deciding how to vote... It does not require proof of a substantial
likelihood that disclosure of the omitted fact would have caused the reasonable investor to change
his vote. What the standard does contemplate is a showing of a substantial likelihood that. under
all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations
of the reasonable shareholder. Put another way, there must be a substantial likelihood that the
disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the "total mix" of information made available [49].
This definition has recently been applied by lower courts under Section 11 of
the 1933 Act [50].
Section 11 specifically identifies those persons who may be sued by the
purchaser: first, everyone who signs the registration statement [51], including
the issuer (who is obliged to sign) [52]; second, both incumbent and prospec-
tive directors of the issuer [53]; third, "experts" who have assisted in the
preparation of the registration statement [54]; and fourth, all underwriters of
the offering [55].
Of particular interest for this article are the provisions relating to experts
and underwriters. Section 1 1(a) (4), the provision covering experts, reads:
[Any person acquiring a security covered by the registration statement may sue] every accountant,
engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose profession gives authority to a statement made by him.
who has with his consent been named as having prepared or certified any part of the registration
statement or as having prepared or certified any report or valuation which is used in connection
with the registration statement (56].
The accountant who certifies financial statements contained in the registration
statement is expressly subject to liability as an expert. Other securities professi-
nals are not typically treated as experts under Section 11. A lawyer, however,
may be held liable where he has provided expertise on certain portions of a
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registration statement [57]. Thus, a lawyer who delivers a tax opinion for use in
a tax shelter offering vill be deemed a statutory expert [58]. Similarly, lawyers'
opinions regarding title to property or the validity of patents are considered
"expertised" portions of the registration statement [591.
As noted above, underwriters of an offering are expressly liable for a
misleading registration statement under Section 11. Liability extends to all
members of the syndicate, regardless of the size of their individual participa-
tions in the offering [60]. Underwriters are also directly liable as "sellers"
under Section 12 of the Securities Act [61].
The primary defenses afforded persons subject to liability under Section
11(a) are detailed in Section 11(b). Section 11(b) provides a due diligence
defense to all defendants except the issuer, who is absolutely liable. If a
defendant is able to demonstrate that he met the statutory standard of care, no
liability will be imposed.
Both the statutory language and the authoritative case applying the statute,
Escott v. BarChris [62], make it clear that the standard of due diligence
required of experts turns on the responsibility of the particular professional for
the defective portion of the registration statement. The expert is liable for those
portions of the registration statement expressly made upon his authority as an
expert [63]. There is no liability for either "expertised" portions not attributed
to that expert or "nonexpertised" portions of the registration statement. In
BarChris, the accountant-defendants were held responsible only for the audited
figures that they had prepared [64].
Regarding the "expertised" portion for which a defendant is liable, the
expert is entitled to show that: "he had, after reasonable investigation,
reasonable ground to believe and did believe, at the time such part of the
registration statement became effective, that the statements therein were true
and that there was no omission to state a material fact" [65]. This due diligence
standard requiring an affirmative duty to verify the accuracy of the "exper-
tised" portions of the registration statement contrasts with the duty imposed
on nonexperts (including underwriters) with respect to the "expertised" por-
tions. Nonexperts may reason'ably rely on experts. Their due diligence defense
need only consist of a showing that they had "no reasonable ground to believe
and did not believe" that there were misstatements or omissions of material
facts [66].
Section 1 (c) defines the standard of reasonableness as "that required of a
prudent man in the management of his own property" [67]. At the very least,
the duty of reasonable investigation requires that the expert comply with
accepted professional standards. The BarChris court found that the accoun-
tant-defendants conducted a verification procedure which failed to conform to
generally accepted auditing standards [68]. The court also stated in dictum that
"accountants should not be held to a standard higher than that recognized in
their profession" [69]. However, accepted professional standards may not
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provide an adequate benchmark for liability where there is an allegation that
the accountant misrepresented that which he knew, as opposed to an allegation
that the accountant failed to discover a material fact because he omitted a
professionally accepted procedure [70]. In United States v. Simon [71], the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that conformity to generally
accepted accounting principles [72] does not necessarily immunize an accoun-
tant from liability where he knowingly participated in the misrepresentation of
fact on a financial statement.
Underwriters are held to a high standard of care under Section 11. They
may reasonably rely on the "expertised" portions of the registration statement,
but they must verify the "nonexpertised" portions. As the court held in
BarChris, "in order to make the underwriters' participation in this enterprise
of any value to the investors, the underwriters must make some reasonable
attempt to verify the data submitted to them" [731. Thus, unlike "experts", the
underwriters' liability is not confined to a limited area. Rather, they have
general liability for the contents of a registration statement.
In the leading article on BarChris [74], Professor Ernest Folk enumerates the
policy considerations underlying the imposition of such a stringent duty of
care on underwriters. First, by underwriting an issue, the investment banker is
publicly perceived to have attested to the quality of the issuer. Second, because
of their expertise and staffing capabilities, underwriters occupy a position that
readily allows them to verify facts concerning an issuer. Third, underwriters
have great flexibility and discretion in undertaking an issue because they
usually do not sign a binding contract with the issuer until the day the
registration statement becomes effective. Fourth, the underwriters' position
vis-A-vis the issue imposes a significant degree of responsibility. The scope of
their authority with respect to the issue includes: an important role in pricing
the offering; the power to form a syndicate; control over the public availability
of a "hot issue"; and the ability to "make a market" in the securities of the
issuer.
Some question remains whether Section I1 responsibilities vary between
classes of underwriters. BarChris held that participating underwriters are liable
where they have relied on the conduct of the lead underwriter who has failed to
meet the prescribed standard of diligence [751. The court specifically refrained,
however, from considering whether the participating underwriters would have
been immunized if the lead underwriter had made a reasonable investigation
[76]. Folk's view is that participating underwriters should be allowed to
delegate their investigatory responsibility to the lead underwriters [77]. The
participants' liability should be predicated on the diligence of the lead under-
writer. The SEC has adopted a slightly different position, outlining a separate
duty for participating underwriters. Under its approach, a "participant may
relieve himself of the tasks of actually verifying the representations in the
registration statement, but... he must satisfy himself that the managing under-
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writer makes the kind of investigation the participant would have performed if
he were manager" [78].
Although a comprehensive examination of the responsibilities of profes-
sionals in their capacity as directors is beyond the scope of this article, it is
significant that BarChris seems to establish a higher degree of care for
"specialist directors" [79] than for other directors. In BarChris, two outside
directors, an attorney who drafted the registration statement, and. a partner in
the lead underwriting firm, were held liable as directors but under standards
generally applicable to their professions. Thus, the standard of diligence for
such "specialist" directors is more stringent than that imposed on outside
directors who have no special expertise in the registration process.
A final issue is whether aiding and abetting theory can extend liability
beyond those defendants specifically named in Section 11. Relying on the
Supreme Court's restrictive approach to implied remedies [80], courts are
tending to conclude that the express language of Section 11 precludes aiding
and abetting liability under Section 11 [81]. As one court remarked, "to
sanction aiding and abetting [liability] would be to essentially gut the statutory
definitions of meaning" [82].
3.2.2. Section 2(11) of the Securities Act of 1933
The scope of Section 11 liability expands when read in conjunction with
Section 2(11) [83], the statutory definition of an underwriter. As already
indicated, underwriters are expressly subject to civil liability under Section 11
for deficiencies in the registration statement [84]. It follows that by limiting or
expanding the definition of underwriters, one limits or expands the class of
potential defendants under Section 11. Section 2(11) expands the scope of
liability by defining underwriters "not with reference to the particular person's
general business but on the basis of his relationship to the particular offering.
No distinction is made between professional investment bankers and rank
amateurs" [85].
The term "underwriter" as defined by Section 2(11) of the Securities Act,
includes: "any person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or
offers or sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribution of any security.
or participates or has a direct or indirect participation in any such undertaking,
or participates or has a participation in the direct or indirect underwriting of
any such undertaking..." [86]. Thus, the statutory definition of underwriter
encompasses a broad range of behavior related to the distribution of securities:
buying with a view to distribution; selling or soliciting in connection with the
distribution; or participation in the distribution.
3.2.3. Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933
Section 12(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 [87], imposes civil liability on any
person who "offers or sells a security in violation of section 5", which requires
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registration of security issuances. No defense is available with respect to
Section 12(1) liability where a purchaser proves a violation of Section 5 by the
seller.
Section 12(2) of the Securities Act [88], a general antifraud provision,
creates a cause of action for a purchaser of securities against one who sold him
the securities by means of a prospectus or oral communcation that included a
misstatement of, or omitted to state, a material fact. Unlike Section 12(1),
Section 12(2) provides the seller an affirmative defense to the statutory
violation. The seller is not liable if he is able to "sustain the burden of proof
that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have
known, of such untruth or omission" [89].
The courts have expanded the scope of professional responsibility under
these provisions by expanding the "seller" class of defendants. Under both
Sections 12(1) and 12(2), the seller of a security is liable to the "purchaser". If
"seller" were narrowly defined as "actual seller," Section 12 would be interpre-
ted as requiring "strict privity". Such an interpretation would restrict the class
of defendants and consequently limit the liabilities of securities professionals
under Sections 12(1) and 12(2). If "seller" is defined to include parties outside
the immediate sales relationship, the "strict privity" requirement is eliminated
and Section 12 becomes a means for imposing liability on a broader class of
securities professionals.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has been a leader in establishing
liability for collateral participants under Section 12. In devising a test for
determining "seller" status under both Sections 12(1) and 12(2), that court in
Hill York Corporation v. American International Franchises, Inc. [90], rejected a
"strict privity" requirement in favor of a "proximate cause" test: "Did the
injury to the plaintiff flow directly and proximately from the actions of this
particular defendant?" [91]. The court emphasized that the "proximate cause"
test was intended as a middle ground between the "antiquated 'strict privity'
concept and the overbroad 'participation' concept that would hold all those
liable who participated in the events leading up to the transaction" [92].
The Fifth Circuit recast the Hill York "proximate cause" test in Lewis v.
Walsion & Co. [93] by focusing on the issue of whether the defendant's actions
were "a 'substantial factor' in bringing about the plaintiff's purchases" [94]. A
subsequent opinion, Pharo v. Smith [95], read Hill York and Lewis as
limiting sections 12(l) and 12(2) sellers (i) to those in privity with the purchaser and (ii) to those
whose participation in the buy-sell transaction is a substantial factor in causing the transaction to
take place. Mere participation in the events leading up to the transaction is not enough. But
beyond the words "substantial factor," we have no guideposts other than the factual situations
presented... to assist us in determining whether to impose strict liability [961.
In Croy v. Campbell [97], applying the test it had articulated in Hill York
and Pharo, the court held that an attorney whose connection with the sale was
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limited to advising the purchaser on its tax consequences was not a Section
12(2) seller. The attorney made no attempt to persuade plaintiffs to make the
purchase. He made no representations to them concerning the operational
aspects of the project in which the plaintiffs ultimately invested. In determin-
ing that the attorney's participation had not proximately caused plaintiff's
injury, the court emphasized that "this conclusion should not be interpreted to
mean that a lawyer who participates in the transaction can never be a seller for
purposes of section 12" [98]. Indeed, in a subsequent case, Junker v. Croiy [99],
the court held the attorney-defendant liable as a Section 12(2) seller, finding
that he was a "key participant" in the transaction. "His role was not that of a
passive advisor as was that of the attorney in Croy; rather, he was an active
negotiator in the transaction, acting as an agent-in-fact as well as attorney-at-
law, implementor not counsellor" [100]. Thus, an attorney may be liable as a
Section 12 seller when he goes beyond his professional role into a promotional
role. This situation contrasts with that of the underwriter or broker who in his
professional capacity directly effects the sale of securities, thereby meeting the
"proximate cause"' or "substantial factor" test.
The participation theory of liability developed under Section 12 is distinct
from other theories of secondary liability. With respect to the latter, some
courts acknowledge a general rule of privity but recognize exceptions in cases
of controlling persons as sellers and in cases of aiders and abettors [101]. These
courts impose liability on the basis of the Section 15 "control" provision [102],
or simply extend the language of Section 12 itself to include aiders, abettors,
and controlling persons as sellers. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
has explicitly refused to extend the Section 12 language to include aiders,
abettors, and controlling persons as sellers [103].
The distinction between the participation theory and these other theories of
secondary liability may be academic. As noted above, the participation theory
has no analytic content. Standards can only be inferred from the courts'
applications of the test to specific factual circumstances. Perhaps the district
court was correct in In re Caesars Palace Securities Litigation:
[As a result of the decisions in this area] it would be nothing more than an exercise in semantic
hair-splitting for this Court to attempt to delineate a legally cognizable distinction between those
categories of persons who have previously been exposed to liability under §12(2) and those persons
charged with aiding and abetting and conspiring in the violation of §12(2). No one of these
formulations is a "magic word"; in effect, each of them indicates participation to one degree or
another. Determination of the extent of this participation and whether or not it is sufficient to
impose liability upon the secondary defendant must obviously await discovery [104].
Courts that have interpreted strictly the privity requirement of Section 12
have found support for their approach in the recent Supreme Court cases that
narrowly construe the securities acts and reject their expansion through tort
and criminal theories [105]. In Collins v. Signetics Coip. [106], the Court of
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Appeals for the Third Circuit looked to the literalist approach of the Supreme
Court in concluding that in the absence of a special relationship between the
issuer-defendant and the seller, such as control, a purchaser who is not in
privity with the issuer has no claim against the issuer under Section 12(2). The
court reasoned:
We have no difficulty in concluding that Congress intended the unambiguous language of
§12(2) to mean exactly what it says: "Any person who...(2) offers or sells a security...shall be
liable to the person purchasing from him.... This section is designed as a vehicle for a purchaser
to claim against his immediate seller. Any broader interpretation would not only torture the plain
meaning of the statutory language but would also frustrate the statutory schema because Congress
has also provided a specific remedy for a purchaser to utilize against the issuer as distinguished
from the seller of a security [i.e. Section I I] [1071.
3.3. Administrative proceedings against broker-dealers and investment advisers
An important means for imposing liability on securities professionals is the
administrative proceedings of the Securities and Exchange Commission and
the self-regulatory organizations [108]. This section considers the statutory
basis for proceeding against registered broker-dealers and investment advisers
as well their employees.
3.3.1. Section 15 of the Exchange Act of 1934
The Securities and Exchange Commission is explicitly empowered to in-
vestigate possible violations of the securities laws [1091. If an investigation
uncovers violations by broker-dealers [110] or investment advisers [1111 the
Commission may institute administrative disciplinary proceedings to establish
responsibility for violations and to impose sanctions. These administrative
proceedings impose professional standards on broker-dealers and investment
advisers.
The statutory authority of the SEC to proceed against broker-dealer firms
is set forth in Section 15(b) (4) of the Securities Exchange Act [112]. Section
15(b) (4) provides a wide range of sanctions with which the SEC may discipline
the firm: censure, limitations on the firm's activities, suspension for up to a
year, and revocation of the firm's registration. Persons associated with
broker-dealer firms [113] are also subject to SEC disciplinary action. Section
15(b) (6) authorizes the Commission to "censure or place limitations on the
activities or functions of any person associated, or seeking to become associ-
ated, with a broker or dealer, or suspend for a period not exceeding twelve
months or bar any such person from being associated with a broker or dealer"
[114]. The Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended in 1975, provides
comparable statutory authority for the institution of adminstrative disciplinary
proceedings against investment advisers and associated persons [115].
In order to impose one of the enumerated sanctions, the SEC must find
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certain statutory violations specified in Section 15(b)(4) of the Securities
Exchange Act or, correspondingly, in Section 203(e) of the Investment Advisers
Act. These grounds for imposing liability are incorporated into Section 15(b)
(6) of the Securities Exchange Act and Section 203(0 of the Advisers Act, the
sections dealing with the liability of associated individuals. The Commission
must show that the firm or associated individual: (1) willfully made a material
misstatement or omission in any report to the Commission [116]; or (2)
willfully violated any provision of the securities acts or rules promulgated
thereunder [117]; or (3) "willfully aided, abetted, counseled, commanded,
induced or procured the violation by any other person... or has failed reasona-
bly to supervise, with a view to preventing violations of the provisions of such
statutes" [118).
Until recently the standard of proof required to sustain a finding of one of
the aforementioned violations in an administrative proceeding was a disputed
issue. The SEC has consistently applied a "preponderance of the evidence"
standard [119]. The burden of proof allocates between the litigants the risk of
erroneous decision-making in a proceeding, and a mere preponderance stan-
dard divides the risk in a "roughly equal fashion" [120].
In Collins Securities Corporation v. SEC [121], the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia rejected the use of the preponderance standard for
certain administrative disciplinary proceedings. Collins held that the more
stringent "clear and convincing evidence" standard should be applied in 1934
Act broker-dealer proceedings when fraud is charged and severe sanctions
imposed. In Whitney v. SEC [122], the court reiterated its decision in Collins,
holding that "any sanction imposed under section 15(b) which depends on
fraud must be sustained by clear and convincing evidence" [123]. The adoption
of such a standard shifts the balance of risk away from the securities profes-
sionals and toward the public.
The Collins and Whqitney decisions did not purport to be all-encompassing.
In Investors Research Corporation v. SEC [124], the same court emphasized
that Collins "required the higher standard in fraud actions where a severe
sanction is imposed" [125]. Accordingly, the court held that the preponderance
standard was sufficient in administrative proceedings for a violation of Section
17(e) (1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 [126] because fraud was not
charged and because the sanction of censure was not severe [127].
The Supreme Court in effect overruled Collins and Whitney in Steadman v.
SEC [128]. At the administrative level, the SEC had applied the preponderance
standard in determining whether the petitioner had violated antifraud provi-
sions of the federal securities laws. Affirming the decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that the "preponderance
of the evidence" standard governs SEC administrative proceedings. Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority, found that Congress had prescribed the
degree of proof that must be adduced by the proponent of a rule or order in an
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administrative proceeding. The securities laws do not indicate which standard
of proof governs Commission adjudications. The Court therefore looked to
Section 7 of the Administrative Procedure Act concerning agency hearings
[129]. The Court construed the explicit language of Section 7, in light of
legislative history, as evidencing congressional intent to adopt the preponder-
ance standard. This conclusion was further supported by the the Commission's
long-standing practice of imposing sanctions according to the preponderance
of the evidence.
In addition to meeting the preponderance test, the Commission must also
demonstrate that the defendant acted "willfully" [130]. The classic interpre-
tation of willfulness was articulated in Tager v. SEC [131]. The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that for the purpose of Section 15, willful
simply means that the act constituting the violation was done intentionally:
"There is no requirement that the actor also be aware that he is violating one
of the Rules or Acts" [132].
Some commentators contend that the courts will read Ernst & Ernst v.
Hoclifelder [133] to require a more stringent definition of "willful", at least in
cases where fraud is alleged [134]. A requirement of scienter in administrative
disciplinary proceedings would necessitate a showing of "either intent to
violate the law, or at least actual or constructive knowledge that the law is
being violated" [135]. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has
remarked in passing that "willfullness... is more or less congruent with
Hochfelder's use of 'scienter'" [1361. In Arthur Lipper Corp. v. SEC [1371, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in reviewing a Section 15(b) proceed-
ing based on a Section 10(b) violation, assumed arguendo that the Hochfelder
culpability standard applied in disciplinary proceedings [138]. And in Stead-
man v. SEC [139], the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that scienter
must be shown in administrative disciplinary proceedings for violations of
Section 17(a) (1) of the Securities Act [140] and Section 206(1) of the Invest-
ment Advisers Act [141], two basic antifraud provisions [142].
Having sustained the burden of proof that the defendant has committed a
willful violation as defined by Section 15(b), the Commission must demon-
strate that the imposition of a sanction is in the "public interest" [143] and
that a particular sanction is appropriate [144]. One commentator has eluci-
dated the "public interest" requirement by referring to constitutional princi-
ples, statutory purposes, and the Commission's practical experience in defining
the "public interest" [145]. On the constitutional level, equal protection and
due process in administrative proceedings embody the "public interest". The
"public interest" is also served where a particular sanction furthers the
purpose of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 - "to insure the maintenance
of fair and honest markets". Finally, the Commission's choice of sanctions has
been shaped by numerous identifiable factors:
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the nature of the violation; the respondent's prior record and reputation; the amount of money
involved and loss, if any, to investors; the number of investors involved; the geographic scope of
the violation; the respondents age, experience, and current status in the business; and the
respondents attitude toward the offense including his willingness to reform and. if loss has been
suffered, to make restitution [146] [footnotes omitted].
A person aggrieved by the final order of the Commission may obtain review
of the order in the United States courts of appeals [147]. In Steadman [148], the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit announced a standard of review which
was not specifically considered in the Supreme Court's affirmance. The court
of appeals applied a "compelling reasons" test [149]. It concluded that there is
a direct relationship between the severity of the sanction imposed by the
Commission and the Commission's burden of justification for imposing that
sanction: "the greater the sanction the Commission decides to impose, the
greater is its burden of justification" [150]. In other words, the Commission
must state "compelling reasons" why a more lenient sanction would not satisfy
the public interest. Rather than develop a standard of review per se, other
courts have simply chastised the SEC for failing to set forth with the requisite
degree of particularity the reasons for imposing servere sanctions [151].
Once it is determined that the SEC has not met its burden of justification or
has failed to give adequate reasons for imposing particular sanctions, appellate
courts usually vacate the order and remand to the Commission [152]. One
court has taken the liberty of changing an SEC imposed sanction without
remanding the case to the Commission [153].
3.3.2. Firm liability for violations by employees and agents
3.3.2.1. Controlling person liability. Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
[154] provides a mechanism for imposing secondary liability on firms [155].
Under this section, a "control" person is subject to the same liability as the
primary violator [156]. Section 20(a) states:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any provision of this title
or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the
same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable,
unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or
acts constituting the violation or cause of action.
The securities acts provide no statutory definition of "control", but rule
12b-2(f), promulgated by the SEC under the Securities Exchange Act, states:
"The term 'control'... means the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to
direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person,
whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise"
[157]. This definition has been applied under Section 20(a) [158].
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Whether control exists depends upon the facts of each case [159]. Professor
Bromberg lists the following factors as relevant:
(a) proportion of voting rights (through stock ownership, trust, proxy or otherwise) relative to
remaining voting rights and relative to percentages required (by statute, charter, by-law. agreement
or otherwise) for pertinent acts; (b) director, officer or other positions of power within the
company; (c) business or financial leverage outside the company, e.g.. by the customer-or-supplier
relationship or by loan agreement; (d) personality factors, and other relationships by family or
through business; (e) history of past cooperation or opposition; (f) with respect to the litigated
transaction, who originated the idea, who negotiated it, who reviewed it, who questioned or
objected to it. who approved it, and related circumstances [1601.
The Commission's definition of control and such factors as the above
indicate that the imposition of liability under Section 20(a) requires "only
some indirect means of discipline or influence short of actual direction" [1611.
In other words, potential control as well as actual control is sufficient for
vicarious liability under Section 20(a) [162].
Secondary liability based on potential control is commonly referred to as
"control by status," i.e. the status of the defendant with respect to the primary
wrongdoer. When the position of the defendant is such that he could have
influenced the primary wrongdoer, he will be deemed a control person. Thus,
in Kaufman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith [163], a brokerage firm
was held liable as a controlling person even though it was not directly involved
in the fraudulent transactions of its employee. The involvement of the firm
merely extended to placing the investment adviser employee on an "approved
list", processing her transactions, and offering substantial advice on transac-
tions. This broad construction of the control status of brokerage firms is
justified by the remedial purpose of Section 20(a) [164].
Other courts have held that liability under Section 20(a) requires more than
a showing of the potential to exercise actual control. Affirmative participation
in the transaction in question is required [165]. For example, in Gordon o. Burr
[166], the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that a brokerage
firm was not a "controlling" person where: the plaintiff was not a regular
customer of the firm; the firm did not manage the questioned transaction
involving purchaser plaintiff's acquisition of stock; and brokers at a meeting of
prospective purchasers of stock were present in their private capacities [167].
Section 20(a) does afford a defense to the firm. Even where control is
established, liability will not be imposed if the "controlling person acted in
good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting
the violation or cause of action" [168]. There is no agreement on the meaning
of this exculpatory language. A court's idiosyncratic interpretation of "control"
determines the elements of a defense to "control" person liability. Jurisdictions
requiring actual control are inclined to find good faith where there is no
culpability on the part of the firm [169]. Culpability for purposes of Section
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20(a) cases includes the subjective element of knowledge about the alleged
wrongdoing [170]. On the other hand, the "control by status" interpretation of
Section 20(a) has required a more objective proof of good faith: the controlling
firm must defend by showing that it met a prescribed duty of supervision [171].
3.3.2.2. Exchsivity of controlling person liability. The availability of a good faith
defense to Section 20 liability is moot where the brokerage firm is also subject
to secondary liability under the common law doctrine of respondeat superior.
Common law agency theory provides for strict liability within the scope of the
employment relationship [172]. The United States courts of appeals are cur-
rently split on whether enactment of Section 20 of the Securities Exchange Act,
as well as Section 15 of the Securities Act, supplanted common law agency
principles, thereby affording the exclusive means by which secondary liability
could be imposed on firms for employees' primary violations of the securities
laws [173].
Only one court of appeals decision directly considers the exclusivity ques-
tion in SEC administrative proceedings [174]. The following discussion there-
fore reviews decisions in private damage actions and SEC civil injunction
actions. The majority of the circuits now support the position that Section 20
does not provide an exclusive remedy [175]. The brokerage firm is subject to
liability under both the statutory controlling person provision and the common
law agency theory of respondeat superior. The circuits that take this view of
concurrent remedies reason that Section 20(a) was not intended to narrow the
remedies against brokerage firms for primary violations of employees (1761.
Rather, Section 20(a) and respondeat superior should be applied in tandem to
prevent brokerage firms from avoiding secondary liability by simply demon-
strating good faith [177]. The policy rationale for denying the good faith
defense to firms through application of respondeat superior is that "investors
rely upon the reputation and prestige of the brokerage firm rather than the
individual employees with whom they deal" [178].
A minority of courts take the position that Section 20(a) furnishes an
exclusive mechanism for imposing vicarious liability on brokerage firms for the
primary violations of employees [179]. Though the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit strictly adheres to the exclusivity doctrine, it has never stated the
reasons for its position [180]. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
though not absolutist, has provided the most illuminating exposition of the
exclusivity doctrine. In Rochez Brothers, Inc. v. Rhoades [181], the president of
a brokerage firm defrauded the vice-president of that firm. The vice-president
sued both the president and the firm for violation of rule lOb-5. In refusing to
hold the firm liable for the independent acts of its president, the court
reasoned that liability could be imposed only upon a showing of culpable
participation under Section 20(a). In enacting Section 20(a), Congress had
rejected the adoption of an "insurer's liability" standard. Application of
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respondeat superior would in effect superimpose "'insurer's liability" on Sec-
tion 20(a) by nullifying the good faith defense. The Third Circuit did leave
room, however, for the application of respondeat superior in cases involving
the relationship between broker-dealer and customer [182].
3.3.2.3. Statutory actions against the firm for primary violations by employees.
Broker-dealer disciplinary actions for violations by employees may proceed
under several statutory provisions. One frequently applied provision is Section
15(b) (4) (E) of the Securities Exchange Act [1831, providing in part that the
SEC shall sanction a brokerage firm for failing to supervise reasonably against
securities law violations by employees [184]. A firm is deemed to have satisfied
the duty of reasonable supervision where:
(i) there have been established procedures, and a system for applying such procedures, which
would reasonably be expected to prevent and detect, insofar as practicable, any such violation by
such other person, and
(ii) [the firm] has reasonably discharged the duties and obligations incumbent upon [it] by
reason of such procedures and system without reasonable cause to believe that such procedures
and system were not being complied with [185].
A firm can also be held liable under Section 15(b) (4) (D) of the Securities
Exchange Act [186], which may be described as a statutory embodiment of the
doctrine of respondeat superior. Section 15(b) (4) (D) authorizes the Commis-
sion to sanction any registered broker or dealer for violations of the securities
laws by the broker or dealer or by "any person associated with such broker or
dealer". As noted previously, the universe of associated persons includes
partners, directors, officers, branch managers, controlling persons, and em-
ployees [187].
3.3.3. Self-regulatory organization proceedings
One sanction available in an SEC administrative disciplinary proceeding
against broker-dealers is the suspension or revocation of the firm's member-
ship in a self-regulatory organization [188]. The Commission may also disci-
pline persons associated with a member firm by suspending or barring such
persons from association with members of the organization [ 189]. Additionally,
the self-regulatory organizations themselves are required by statute to disci-
pline members for securities law violations or infractions of their own rules or
regulations [190].
Congress has allocated an important role to industry self-regulation. Self-
regulation has been thought to have many significant benefits, including "the
expertise and intimate familiarity with complex securities operations which
members of the industry can bring to bear on regulatory problems, and the
informality and flexibility of self-regulatory procedures" [191]. Accordingly,
Congress authorized the formation of self-regulated national securities associ-
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ations under Section 15A of the Securities Exchange Act [192] and entrusted
national securities exchanges with self-regulatory powers in Section 6 of the
Act [193].
The National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD), the only
national securities association registered with the SEC under Section 15A, is
composed of firms trading in the over-the-counter market, including members
of the national securities exchanges. Section 15A(b) (6) [194] requires that the
NASD adopt rules for regulating the conduct of member firms and associated
persons in accordance with "just and equitable principles of trade" [195]. This
phrase has come to include the provisions of the Securities Exchange Act, rules
and regulations promulgated thereunder [196], and the internal rules of the
association [197].
The NASD is also obliged to enforce compliance through the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions on its members and associated persons [198]. The
penalties for violations of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice include censure,
fine, suspension of membership or registration of a person associated with a
member, and expulsion of a member or revocation of the registration of an
associated person [199].
The NASD administrative disciplinary proceedings are subject to SEC
oversight [200]. The written conclusions of the NASD Board of Governors
must be filed with the SEC, which may review the matter on its own motion or
on the motion of an aggrieved party [201]. Section 19(e) [202] authorizes the
Commission to affirm or modify a NASD sanction, or to remand to the NASD
for further consideration [203]. As a last resort, an aggrieved party has recourse
to the appropriate United States court of appeals [204].
The congressionally mandated scheme of self-regulation with SEC oversight
of national securities exdhanges is virtually identical to that provided for the
national securities associations. The exchanges are under the same obligations
to establish rules hr furtherance of "just and equitable principles of trade"
[205] and to enforce compliance with such rules [206]. Similarly, a disciplinary
sanction imposed through an exchange administrative proceeding is subject to
review by the SEC [207] and appellate courts [208].
3.4. SEC disciplinary proceedings against attorneys and accountants
3.4.1. Operation and administration of rule 2(e)
Rule 2(e) of the SEC Rules of Practice [209] authorizes the Commission to
discipline attorneys, accountants, and others [210] by suspending or perma-
nently revoking the privilege of practicing before it (described hereinafter as
"disbarment"). "Practicing before the Commission" has been broadly con-
strued [211], thereby allowing the Commission relatively far-reaching disci-
plinary powers. In the wake of geometric increases in the number of disci-
plinary proceedings instituted pursuant to rule 2(e) over the past decade [212],
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rule 2(e) has become the most controversial mechanism for imposing liability
on securities professionals [213]. The controversy is attributable not only to the
increased frequency of rule 2(e) proceedings (often directed at major firms as
well as individual practitioners) but also to the expanding scope of conduct
subject to SEC discipline [214]. The technical operation of rule 2(e) and the
controversy surrounding the Commission's administration of the rule are
considered below.
Rule 2(e) is applied in three different situations. First, 2(e) (1) [215] provides
for suspension or disbarment following an administrative proceeding before
the Commission, initiated at the request of the general counsel. Second, under
paragraph (2) of rule 2(e) [216] a professional is automatically suspended
when: a state authority has suspended or revoked the practitioner's license, or
the respondent has been "convicted of a felony or misdemeanor involving
moral turpitude". Third, an accountant or attorney who has been permanently
enjoined from violating the securities laws or who has been found to have
violated the securities laws may be temporarily suspended from practicing
before the Commission without a hearing [217].
Rule 2(e) (1), authorizing administrative disbarment proceedings by the
Commission, is the most controversial feature of the rule. It establishes three
independent bases for the imposition of sanctions in such a proceeding: (i) lack
of qualifications to represent others; (ii) unethical or improper professional
conduct; or (iii) willful violations or willful aiding and abetting violations of
the securities laws [218].
Lack of qualifications seldom has been used as a basis for a 2(e) proceeding
[219]. The Commission has increasingly imposed sanctions for violations of
professional standards of conduct, though the Commission rarely brings a
disciplinary proceeding against an attorney solely on this basis [220]. As a
general matter, rule 2(e) (1) proceedings against attorneys involve charges of
primary violations or of aiding and abetting violations of the securities laws
[2211.
In the much debated opinion of In re Carter & Johnson [222], the Securities
and Exchange Commission defined "unethical or improper professional con-
duct" by attorneys for rule 2(e) (1) (ii). An attorney violates the norms of
ethical and professional conduct in the following circumstances:
When a lawyer with significant responsibilities in the effectuation of a company's compliance with
the disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws becomes aware that his client is engaged
in a substantial and continuing failure to satisfy those disclosure requirements, his continued
participation violates professional standards unless he takes prompt steps to end the client's
non-compliance [223].
The affirmative action required of the attorney may include resignation or
"'a direct approach to the board of directors". Departing from the standard
enunciated by the administrative law judge, the Commission declined to
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require the attorney to disclose his clients' violations to interested third parties.
such as company shareholders, to the public or to the SEC. The Commission
did note that disclosure might be required by other standards of professional
conduct, such as the American Bar Association Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)
[224]. DR 7-102(B) requires that the attorney who learns that
his client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal
shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so,
he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal, except when the information is a
privileged communication [225].
The recent debate over attorneys' responsibilities to prevent violations by
clients was precipitated by SEC v. National Student Marketing [226], an
injunction action under rule lOb-5 [227]. In its provocative complaint [228], the
SEC. alleged that the National Student Marketing Corporation (NSMC) and
the Interstate National Corporation (INC) issued a misleading joint proxy
statement to solicit their shareholders' approval of the merger of INC into
NSMC. Although NSMC's interim income statement contained in the proxy
showed a profit, a draft "comfort letter" prepared by NSMC auditors and
delivered at the closing revealed that NSMC had in fact suffered a loss for the
interim period. The SEC claimed that, before closing, the counsel for INC and
NSMC should have insisted that the interim financial statement be revised and
that INC's shareholders be resolicited. In the absence of the client's acquies-
cence to these demands, counsel should have resigned and notified the Com-
mission about the misleading nature of the nine months' financial statement.
The district court did not reach the Commission's theory, finding it "unneces-
sary to determine the precise extent of [the lawyers'] obligations here since...
they took no steps whatsoever to delay the closing pending disclosure to and
resolicitation of the Interstate shareholders" [229].
The Carter & Johnson decision suggests that the SEC has abandoned its
position that attorneys must "blow the whistle" on their clients, imposing
instead a duty to seek higher authority within the corporate structure. The
movement from National Student Marketing to Carter & Johnson reflects a
moderation of the "access theory" discussed in section 2 supra. As already
indicated, this theory posits that insofar as attorneys supply the "passkey" to
the capital markets through their role in providing services and advice [230],
they are obliged to ensure that the markets remain orderly and fair. Under the
access theory, the role of the securities lawyer as an independent "ombudsman"
in the securities markets supplants that of advocate. The attorney is not simply
a spokesman for the client but owes certain responsibilities to the public.
Likening the position of the attorney to that of the independent auditor,
former Commissioner Sommer has remarked that these responsibilities require
"the healthy skepticism toward the representations of management which a
good auditor must adopt" [231]. Theoretically, where management is defraud-
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ing the investing public and fails to respond to counsel's advice, the securities
attorney as an independent "ombudsman" must "blow the whistle" or, under
the less extreme version of the access theory, seek higher authority within the
corporate structure.
Subsequent to Carter & Johnson, the SEC solicited public comment on the
standard of ethical conduct the Commission had enunciated in that case. The
American Bar Association (ABA) responded by filing a statement which did
not comment on the Commission's proposed standard itself but challenged the
very authority of the Commission to promulgate such a standard [232]. In fact,
the ABA House of Delegates has recently recommended federal legislation that
would bar federal agencies from exercising disciplinary authority over lawyers
practicing before them [233].
The bar is not totally averse to a standard of conduct that would include the
duties to "seek higher authority" and "blow the whistle", as long as federal
agencies are not the enforcers. The "proposed final draft" of the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct that would set standards for attorneys representing
corporate clients includes the highly controversial rule 1.13 [234]. If a lawyer
knows that a corporate officer or employee is engaged in conduct that is a
violation of a legal obligation to the corporation or that is a violation of law
which might be imputed to the corporation and result in "material injury" to
it, he is required under proposed rule 1.13(b) to "proceed as reasonably
necessary in the best interest of the organization" [235]. The measures taken to
satisfy the standard may include asking reconsideration of the matter, advising
that a separate legal opinion on the matter be sought, and referring the matter
to the highest authority in the organization. If the highest authority in the
organization fails to take corrective action, the attorney may disclose the
situation to the shareholders or others who can act to protect the organization
where: "(I) the highest authority in the organization has acted to further the
personal or financial interests of members of that authority which are in
conflict with the interests of the organization; and (2) revealing the informa-
tion is necessary in the best interest of the organization" [236].
In addition to lack of qualifications to represent others and unethical or
improper professional conduct, a third basis for instituting an original disci-
plinary proceeding against an attorney or accountant is an allegation that the
professional "willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the violation of
any provision of the Federal securities laws, or the rules and regulations
thereunder" [237]. This provision was added by amendment to the rule in 1970
[238] and in part explains the increase in the number of proceedings against
attorneys. As stated in the above discussion, "unethical or improper conduct"
rarely is alleged in 2(e) proceedings involving attorneys absent charges of
securities laws violations.
This amendment in essence authorizes the Commission to use rule 2(e)
proceedings as an alternative to an injunction action or referral to the Justice
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Department for a criminal prosecution. Their use for that purpose is a matter
of controversy. The Commission has maintained that rule 2(e) is not an
alternative enforcement remedy [239]. Rather, "it is addressed to a different
problem - professional misconduct - and its sanction is limited to that
necessary to protect the investing public and the Commission from the future
impact on its processes of professional misconduct" [240]. Others maintain that
this purported purpose is not the SEC's real purpose [2411. The most recent
general counsel to the SEC, Edward F. Greene, seems to agree with this view:
"If the lawyer's conduct amounts to a violation of, or aiding and abetting a
violation of the federal securities laws, we should as a general matter sue to
enjoin the attorney for [sic] repetition of such conduct, not bring a 2(e)
proceeding" [242]. Given that 2(e) (1) actions against attorneys are rarely
brought for lack of requisite qualifications and 2(e) (1) actions based on
allegations of "improper or unethical conduct" are usually tied to allegations
of securities laws violations, one could predict that few if any disciplinary
actions against attorneys would be brought under Mr. Greene's interpretation
of the rule.
Once a basis for the 2(e) proceeding is established, the Commission must
show that the attorney's or accountant's misconduct is connected with the
Commission's processes. This requirement flows from the purported purpose
of rule 2(e): to protect the integrity of the administrative process. This element
of a 2(e) case has been referred to as the "nexus" requirement [243].
The "nexus" requirement has been broadly construed. The alleged connec-
tion with the Commission's processes has become increasingly tenuous in 2(e)
cases [244]. In recent years, 2(e) proceedings have been instituted in situations
involving no direct relationship between the misconduct of the respondent and
a Commission proceeding or filing [245].
The broad construction of the "nexus" requirement is in part attributable to
the expansive definition of "practice before the Commission". As mentioned
above, the Commission's disciplinary powers extend to denying the privilege of
practicing before it. The definition of "practice before the Commission" sets
the bounds of the Commission's processes and in turn determines the scope of
conduct subject to disciplinary sanctions. Thus, where practice before the
Commission is defined to include "any participation, involving legal advice
respecting the federal securities laws, in the preparation or dissemination of
any offering memorandum... and... any participation in the preparation or
dissemination of any oral or .written opinion dealing with the federal securities
laws" [246], the scope of misconduct brought within the disciplinary authority
of the Commission is quite broad. The "nexus" between the administrative
processes and the misconduct is therefore attenuated.
The scope of rule 2(e) disciplinary proceedings may be restricted over the
course of the next few years. Mr. Greene has commented:
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(Aibsent extraordinary circumstances I would be concerned if our office were to urge the
Commission to invoke Rule 2(e) to exercise disciplinary authority over attorneys rendering legal
advice to clients concerning matters arising under the federal securities laws, but who do not
actually appear before the Commission or who are not involved in the preparation of reporting and
disclosure documents filed with the Commission. Such an application of Rule 2(e) could entangle
the Commission in the regulation of lawyers' routine office practice. This traditional area is
generally more appropriately left to state and local regulation, and to Commission injunctive
actions in cases where the lawyer has aided violations of the securities laws 1247].
3.4.2. Firm liability for rule 2(e) violations
Rule 2(e) has been used to reach the firm as well as the individual
practitioner. Though disciplinary sanctions against law and accounting firms
have been imposed with increasing frequency, the Commission has failed to
articulate adequately the legal theories underlying such liability.
The doctrinal bases for the SEC disciplinary actions against the firm fall
into two catefories: vicarious liability and firm-wide fault [248]. Touche Ross &
Co. v. SEC [249] raised a question about the authority of the Commission to
sanction firms under 2(e) on the basis of vicarious liability, although the court
did not explicitly address the issue. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit suggested that the Commission might want to consider whether Con-
gress has in fact delegated authority to sanction the firm on a theory of
respondeat superior and whether appropriate standards for such a proceeding
have been established through rulemaking. The Commission has yet to con-
sider openly the applicability of the theory of respondeat superior in the 2(e)
context.
The Commission more frequently has made firm-wide fault the basis for
imposing liability on firms. The cases suggest three general theories of liability.
First, the firm may be held liable if the public has relied on the firm's
representations [250]. Thus, where an accounting firm issues a report in its
own name, it will be held responsible for the contents. Second, involvement of
top management or substantial numbers of the firm's members will implicate
the firm. In In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp [251], the Commission
imposed sanctions on a law firm where almost every member of the firm was
aware of one or more of the material transactions deemed by the Commission
to involve inadequate or misleading disclosure. Third, a firm may be held liable
where its internal procedures were not adequate to prevent or detect miscon-
duct. This is analogous to imposing liability on brokerage firms for the failure
to supervise [2521. In Keating, the division of authority among partners
impaired communication within the firm and partners with material informa-
tion failed to inform properly the member of the firm responsible for the
filings with the Commission. In the offer of settlement the firm agreed to
"adopt, maintain and implement additional internal and supervisory proce-
dures which are reasonably designed to ensure that respondent has adequate
procedures with respect to representation in matters involving federal securities
laws" [253].
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3.4.3. The future of rule 2(e) proceedings
In addition to controversy surrounding the operation and administration of
the rule, critics have contested the very authority of the Commission to
promulgate a rule empowering it to discipline accountants and particularly
attorneys. Only one court has considered the authority of the Commission to
adopt and administer rule 2(e). In Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC [254], the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the Commission's authority to
initiate 2(e) proceedings against accountants. The court concluded that the
authority of the Commission could be implied from the Commission's general
statutory power to adopt rules and regulations necessary for the implementa-
tion of the securities laws [255]. In dictum, the court suggested that the same
reason for the authority of the Commission to discipline accountants -
protecting the integrity of the administrative process - applies equally to 2(e)
proceedings against attorneys. The court stated that limited resources require
the Commission to "rely heavily on both the accounting and legal professions
to perform their tasks diligently and responsibly. Breaches of professional
responsibility jeopardize the achievement of the objectives of the securities
laws and can inflict great damage on public investors" [256]. In Carter &
Johnson, a 2(e) case involving attorneys, the SEC adopted the reasoning of the
Second Circuit in holding that rule 2(e) is clearly within the Commission's
authority.
The most outspoken critic of the Commission's exercise of disciplinary
power over attorneys and accountants is former Commissioner Roberta Karmel
[257]. In Keating, Muething & Klekarnp, Commissioner Karmel dissented from
the disciplinary action against a law firm. According to Karmel, while express
statutory provisions legitimize disciplinary proceedings against accountants
under the Commission's general rulemaking authority, no comparable statu-
tory provisions givern attorneys. The securities laws empower the Commission
to regulate the terms and form of financial statements [258] and to require that
the statements be certified by an independent public accountant [259]. The
administrative sanctioning of accountants is arguably a necessary and ap-
propriate adjunct to an express Commission mandate and responsibility. In In
re Darrell L. Nielson [260], Commissioner Karmel maintained that even the
legitimacy of 2(e) proceedings against accountants is "not free from doubt".
Many commentators agree with the former Commissioner, adding that the
procedural safeguards which attend judicial proceedings under the securities
laws are lacking in 2(e) proceedings: due process questions arise about the
legitimacy of rule 2(e) as a mechanism for imposing liabilities on securities
professionals [261].
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4. Conclusion
This review of the major types of liabilities indicates that the exposure of
securities professionals to liability as non-principals in securities transactions is
comprehensive. The evolution of this encompassing complex of liabilities is
marked by the expansion of liability beyond the responsibilities expressly
prescribed by Congress. In the case of lawyers, for example, no explicit
standards of conduct are set forth in the securities acts. Yet, the vulnerability
of lawyers to liability for the illegal securities transactions of principals has
increased dramatically through secondary liability and rule 2(e) disciplinary
proceedings.
There are indications that the scope of liabilities is now contracting.
Supreme Court decisions since 1975, which have assumed a literalist approach
toward the securities acts, may augur a trend towards limiting liability to the
express prescriptions of the acts. In addition, the more pronounced conserva-
tism of SEC personnel under the Reagan administration will likely lead to
moderation in the use of rule 2(e) disciplinary proceedings. Nevertheless, the
degree to which this confluence of judicial and administrative restraint will
limit the liabilities of securities professionals is uncertain.
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[120] Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979). See also Steadman V. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126,
1139 (5th Cir. 1979), aff.'d, 450 U.S. 91 (1981).
[121] 562 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
[122] 604 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
[123] Id. at 681.
[124] 628 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 919 (1980).
[125] Id. at 175 n.41.
[126] 15 U.S.C. §80a-17(e) (1) (1976). This section makes it unlawful for an affiliated person of
a registered investment company,
acting as agent, to accept from any source any compensation (other than a regular salary or wages
from such registered company) for the purchase or sale of any property to or for such registered
company or any controlled company thereof, except in the course of such person's business as an
underwriter or broker.
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[1271 See also Decker v. SEC. 631 F.2d 1380 (10th Cir. 1980).
[128 450 U.S. 91 (1981).
[1291 5 U.S.C. §556 (1976).
11301 See Securities Exchange Act §§15(b) (4) (A),(D),(E) & §15(b) (6). 15 U.S.C. §§78o(b) (4)
(A).(D).(E) & §78o(b) (6) (1976). See also Investment Advisers Act §§203(e) (1).(4).(5) & §203(f).
15 U.S.C. §§80b-3(e) (1),(4),(5) & §80b-3(f) (1976).
[131) 344 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965).
[1321 Id. at 8. See also Decker v. SEC. 631 F.2d at 1386; International Shareholders Services
Corp. v. SEC, [1975-76 Transfer Binder) Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,493 at 86.285 (SEC April
29, 1976); A.J. White & Co., 3 SEC Docket 550. 551 (SEC 1974). affd556 F.2d 619 (lst Cir.), cert.
denied. 434 U.S. 969 (1977).
[1331 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
[1341 See. e.g.. Matthews, Litigation and Settlement in SEC Admtinistrative Enforcement Pro-
ceedings, 29 Cath. U. L. Rev. 215, 238-40 (1980). It will be recalled that Hochfelder held that
scienter is an element of a Section lOb/rule lOb-5 cause of action.
[1351 Matthews, supra note 134, at 240.
[1361 Whitney v. SEC, 604 F.2d at 682 n.23. See also Wasson v. SEC, 558 F.2d 879. 887 (8th
Cir. 1977).
[1371 547 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1976). cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978).
[1381 Id. at 180 n.6, 181. See also EdwardJ. Mawood & Co. v. SEC, 591 F.2d 588. 596 (10th
Cir. 1979) (following the lead of the Commission, the court assumed that the Hochfelder standard
applied to a determination of willfulness in an administrative proceeding for a 10-b violation of the
Securities Exchange Act).
[139] 603 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1979). affd, 450 U.S. 91 (1981).
[140] 15 U.S.C. §77q(a) (1) (1976).
[1413 15 U.S.C. §80b-6(I) (1976).
11421 See Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d at 1143.
[143) See Securities Exchange Act §§15(b) (4). (6). 15 U.S.C. §§78o(b) (4). (6) (1976):
Investment Advisers Act §203(e). (f). 15 U.S.C. §§80b-3(e). (f) (1976).
[144] Matthews, supra note 134, at 241-44; Thomforde. Patterns of Disparity in SEC Admij-
tstrauve Sanctioning Practice, 42 Tenn. L. Rev. 465, 470-474 (1975).
[145] Thomforde, supra note 144.
[ 146] Id. at 473-74.
[1471 Securities Exchange Act §25(a). 15 U.S.C. §78y(a) (1976).
[1481 603 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1979). affd, 450 U.S. 91 (1981).
[149] Id. at 1139-40.
[1501 Id. at 1139.
[1511 See, e.g., Nassar & Co., Inc. V. SEC, 566 F.2d 790, 794 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
[152] See. e.g.. Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1979). aff'd, 450 U.S. 91 (1981).
11531 Arthur Lipper Corp. v. SEC. 547 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1976).
[1541 15 U.S.C. §78t(a) (1976).
[155] The pertinent literature includes: Note, "Controlling Persons" Liability of Broker-Dealers
for Their Employees' Federal Securities Violations, 1974 Duke L.J. 824 (1976); Note, Burden of
Control: Derivative Liabiltyr Under Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 1019 (1973); Note. Securities Regulation: "Control" Person Liability Under Section 20(a) of
the Exchange Act. 33 Okla. L. Rev. 665 (1980); Comment, A Comparison of Control Person Liability
and Respondeat Superior: Section 20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act [sic]. 15 Cal. W. L. Rev.
152 (1979); Comment. Secondary Liability of Controlling Persons Under the Securities Acts: Toward
an Improved Analysis, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1345 (1978).
[156] See also Section 15 the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §77o (1976). which provides for liability
of persons who control a primary violator of Sections I 1 or 12 of the Securities Act. 15 U.S.C.
§§77k. I (1976).
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[157] 17 C.F.R. 240.12b-2(f) (1982). See also Securities Act rule 405(f). 17 C.F.R. §230.405(f)
(1982).
[158] See, e.g., Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Con,nerce Bank. 630 F.2d 1111, 1120 (5th Cir.
1980); Rochez Brothers, Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 890 (3d Cir. 1975); Kaufman v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 464 F.Supp. 528, 538 (D. Md. 1978).
[159] It is apparent that this was intended by Congress. See H.R. Rep. No. 1383. 73d Cong. 2d
Sess. 26 (1934).
[160] 2 A. 'Bromberg, Securities Law §4.7 (634) at 88.107-08 (1975).
[161] Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 738 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
[162] See, e.g., Bird v. Ferry, 497 F.2d 112, 117-118 (5th Cir. 1974); Richardson o. MacArthur,
451 F.2d 35,41-42 (10th Cir. 1971); Myzel t. Fields, 386 F.2d at 738; Savino o. E.F. Hutton & Co..
507 F.Supp. 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Kaufman o. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 464 F.Supp.
at 538.
[163] 464 F.Supp. 528 (D. Md. 1978).
[164] See Myzel o. Fields, 386 F.2d at 738.
[165] See, e.g., Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Ic., 588 F.2d 665, 668-69 (9th Cir. 1978);
Rochez Bros., Inc., v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d at 891; Gordon o. Burr, 506 F.2d 1080, 1086 (2d Cir.
1974).
[166] 506 F.2d 1080 (2d Cir. 1974).
[167] Id. at 1086.
[168] The defense provided to a control person by Section 15 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.
§77o (1976), is somewhat different. He must defend by showing that he "had no knowledge of or
reasonable grounds to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the
controlled person is alleged to exist".
[169] See, e.g., Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 588 F.2d at 668-669; Rochez Brothers, Inc. o.
Rhoades, 527 F.2d at 890; Gordon v. Burr, 506 F.2d at 1086; Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F2d 1277,
1299 (2d Cir. 1973).
[170] See, e.g., Lanza o. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d at 1300-1304.
[171] See, e.g., Marbury Management, Inc. o. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1011 (1980); Paud F. Newton & Co. o. Texas Commerce Bank. 630 F.2d at 1120; SEC v.
First Securities Co. of Chicago, 463 F.2d 981, 987 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1041 (1972).
[172] See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Agency §§219, 257 (1958):
§219. When Master is Liable for Torts of His Servants:
(1) A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope
of their employment.
(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of their
employment, unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences. or
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or
(d) the servant purported. to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there.was a reliance
upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the
agency relation.
§257. Misrepresentations; in General
A principal is subject to liability for loss caused to another by the other's reliance upon a tortious
representation of a servant or other agent, if the representation is:
(a) authorized;
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(b) apparently authorized: or
(c) within the power of the agent to make for the principal.
1 173] For detailed discussions of the split, see Reininger, Exclusive or Concurrent - The Role of
Control and Respondeat Superior in the Imposition of Vicartous Civil Liability on Broker- Dealers. 9
Sec. Reg. IL J. 226 (1981); Matthews. Litigation and Settlement of SEC Administrative Enforcement
Proceedings, 29 Cath. U. L. Rev. 215 (1980); Note. Rule lob-5 and Vicarious Liability Based on
Respondeat Superior. 69 Calif. L. Rev. 1513 (1981). See also, Fischel. Secondary Liability Under
Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934 [sic], 69 Calif. L. Rev. 80 (1981).
[174] Armstrong, Jones & Co. v. SEC. 421 F.2d 359 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970)
(affirmed sanction of broker-dealer for violations of agents under doctrine of respondeat superior).
See also A.J. White & Co. v. SEC, 556 F.2d 619, 624 (1st Cir.). cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977)
(citing Armstrong for proposition that brokerage firm "can act only through its agents, and is
accountable for the actions of its responsible officers").
[ 175] See Henricksen v. Henricksen, 640 F.2d 880 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1097 (1981):
Paul F. Neivton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir. 1980); Marburt,
Management. Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.). cert. denied, 449 U.S. 101 I (1980); Holloway v.
Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976): Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1975).
[176 Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn. 629 F.2d at 716.
[177 Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank. 630 F.2d at 1118-19.
[1781 Id.
1179] See, e.g., Christoffel v. E.F Hutton & Co.. 588 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1978): Rochez Brothers.
itc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
[180] See Christoffel v. E.F Hutton & Co., 588 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1978); Zweig v. Hearst. 521
F.2d 1129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975): Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co.,
382 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1967). cert. granted, 390 U.S. 942. cert. denied (by stipulation), 393 U.S. 801
(1968).
1181] 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975).
[182] Id. at 886. See also Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand. 649 F.2d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 1981).
[1831 15 U.S.C. §78o(b) (4) (E) (1976).
[184] See, e.g., SEC v. Geon Industries, Inc.. 531 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976): In re Wuiff Hansen &
Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 19081 (Sept. 27. 1982); in re First Interregional Equity
Corp., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 19039 (Sept. 7. 1982); In re Bache Halsey Stuart
Shields, Inc., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,249 (SEC Aug. 24, 1982); In re J.B.
Hanauer & Co., [ 1981-82 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) V83.099 (SEC Feb. 11. 1982);
In re Frank J. Guiffrida United Monetary Services, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 17335
(SEC Nov. 15, 1980); It re Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep.
(CCH) 82,125 (SEC July 5, 1979).
[1851 15 U.S.C. §78o(b) (4) (E) (1976).
[186] 15 U.S.C. §78o(b) (4) (D) (1976).
[187] Securities Exchange Act §3(a) (18). 15 U.S.C. §78c(a) (18) (1976).
[188] Securities Exchange Act §19(h) (2). 15 U.S.C. §78s(h) (2) (1976).
[189] Securities Exchange Act §19(h) (3), 15 U.S.C. §78s(h) (3) (1976).
[190] See Securities Exchange Act §§15A(b) (2), (7) & §19(h) (1), 15 U.S.C. §§78o-3(b) (2), (7)
& §78s(h) (1) (1976).
[ 191] Report of the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking. Housing
and Urban Affairs, Securities Industry Study, S. Doc. No. 93-13, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 149 (1973).
reprinted in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. NASD, 616 F.2d 1363, 1366 (5th Cir.
1980).
[1921 15 U.S.C. §78o-3 (1976).
[1931 15 U.S.C. §78f (1976).
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[194] 15 U.S.C. §78o-3(b) (6) (1976).
[195] Id. See also NASD Rules of Fair Practice. Art. II, §1, reprinted in NASD Manual (CCH)
2151 (1981) ("A member, in the conduct of his business, shall observe high standards of
commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade").
[196] See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act §19(h) (1) (B), 15 U.S.C. §78s(h) (1) (B) (1976), which
would seem to require NASD to enforce compliance with the Securities Exchange Act and related
rules and regulations.
[197] See NASD Rules of Fair Practice, reprinted in NASD Manual (CCH) (1981).
[198] See Securities Exchange Act §§15A(b) (2),(7) & §19(h) (1), 15 U.S.C. §§78o-3(b) (2),(7) &
§78s(h) (1) (1976).
[199] NASD Rules of Fair Practice, reprinted in NASD Manual (CCH) 2301 (1981).
[200] Securities Exchange Act §§19(d),(e), 15 U.S.C. §§78s(d). (e) (1976).
[201] Securities Exchange Act §§19(d) (1), (2), 15 U.S.C. §§78s(d) (1), (2) (1976).
[202] See Securities Exchange Act §§19(e) (1), (2), 15 U.S.C. §§78s(e) (1), (2) (1976).
[203] See, e.g., In re Wall Street West, Inc., [1981-82 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
83,069 (SEC Dec. 9, 1981) (affirmed); In re Stix & Co., [1976-77 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 80,722 (SEC Sept. 2, 1976) (modified); In re Samuel A. Sardinia, [1975-76 Transfer
Binderi Fed. Sec. L. Rep; (CCH) 80,501 (SEC April 27, 1976) (modified).
[2041 Securities Exchange Act §25, 15 U.S.C. §78y (1976). See, e.g., Sorrell V. SEC, 679 F.2d
1323 (9th Cir. 1982); Sirianni v. SEC, 67 F.2d 1284 (9th Cir. 1982); Seaton v. SEC, 670 F.2d 1309
(D.C. Cir. 1982).
[205] Securities Exchange Act §6(b) (5), 15 U.S.C. §78f(b) (5) (1976).
[2061 Securities Exchange Act §§6(b) (1), (6) & §19(h) (1), 15 U.S.C. §§78f(b) (1), (6) & §78s(h)
(1) (1976).
[207] Securities Exchange Act §§19(d),(e), 15 U.S.C. §§78s(d), (e) (1976).
[208] Securities Exchange Act §25, 15 U.S.C. §78(y) (1976).
[209] 17 C.F.R. §201.2(e) (1981).
[210] Paragraph (1) of the rule pertaining to original administrative proceedings actually
authorizes the Commission to discipline "any person" who violates the enumerated standards. The
rule has in practice only been applied to accountants and attorneys.
[211] "Practicing before the Commission" is defined in 17 C.F.R. §201.2(g) (1981). as
including but not limited to "(1) transacting any business with the Commission; and (2) the
preparation of any statement, opinion or other paper by any attorney, accountant, engineer or
other expert, filed withi the Commission". The Commission has liberally applied this definition.
See, e.g.. In re Petrallia, Turk, and DiConsiglio, Securities Act Release No. 5963 (Aug. 25, 1978)
(definition expanded to include "[3] any participation, involving legal advice respecting the federal
securities laws, in the preparation or dissemination of any offering memorandum... and [4] any
participation in the preparation or dissemination of any oral or written opinion dealing with the
federal securities laws").
[212] See Marsh, Rule 2(e) Proceedings, 35 Bus. Law. 987. 988 (1980).
[213] See, e.g., Daley & Karmel, Attorneys' Responsibilities: Adversaries at the Bar of the SEC,
24 Emory L. J. 747 (1975); Dolin, SEC Rule 2(e) After Carter-Johnson: Toward a Reconciliation of
Purpose and Scope, 9 See. Reg. L..Rev. 331 (1982); Downing & Miller, The Distortion and Misuse
of Rule 2(e), 54 Notre Dame Law. 774 (1979); Gross, Attorneys and Their Corporate Clients: SEC
Rule 2(e) and the Georgetoivn 'Whistle Blowing' Proposal, 3 Corp. L. Rev. 197 (1980); Fiflis, Choice
of Federal or State Law forAttorneys' Professional Responsibility in Securities Matters, 56 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1236 (1981); Karmel, A Delicate Assignment: The Regulation of Accounting by the SEC, 56
N. Y. U. L Rev. 959 (1981); Marsh, supra note 212; Note, SEC Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Attorneys Under Rule 2(e), 79 Mich. L. Rev. 1270 (1981). See generally The Evolving Problens for
and Responsibilities of Attorneys Under the Federal Securities Lavs, 36 Bus. Law. 1777 (1981).
[214] See Dolin, supra note 213, at 338; Marsh, supra note 212, at 990-'91.
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[2151 17 C.F.R. §201.2(e) (I) (1981).
[2161 17 C.F.R. §201.2(e) (2) (1981).
[2171 17 C.F.R. §201.2(e) (3) (1981).
[2181 See generally Marsh, supra note 212. at 995-98.
[2191 Ferrara. Admnimstratve Disciplinary Proceedings Under Rule 2(e). 36 Bus. Law. 1807. 1809
(1981).
[2201 On the other hand. 2(e) (1) proceedings against accountants are frequently based solely
on violations of professional conduct standards. See, e.g., In re Lester Witte & Co., [Accounting
Releases Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 972,307 (SEC Jan. 7. 1981).
[2211 See Greene. Laivyer Disciplnary Proceedings before the Securities and Exchange Connis-
sion, 14 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 168, 170 (Jan 20, 1982).
[222] [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T82,847 (SEC Feb. 28, 1981).
[223] Id. at 84,172.
[224] Model Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 2, DR 7-102(B) (1979).
[2251 Id.
[226 457 F.Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
[2271 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1982).
[228] SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., [1971-72 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec, L. Rcp.
(CCH) 193,360 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 3, 1972).
[229] 457 F.Supp. at 713.
[230] Sommer, The Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities Lanyer. [1973-74 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79.631 at 83,689 (Jan. 1974).
[2311 Id. at 83,690.
[232] See SEC Standard of Conduct for Lawyers, reprinted in 37 Bus. Law. 915 (1982).
[233] See Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) Vol. 14, No. 33 at 1477 (1982).
[234] Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.13 (Proposed Final Draft. 1981).
[2351 Id.
[236] Id.
[237] 17 C.F.R. §201.2(e) (1) (iii) (1981).
[238] Securities Act Release No. 5088. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,913 (Sept. 24. 1970).
[239] See, e.g., Ferrara, supra note 219. at 1807.
[2401 In re Carter & Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82.847 at
84.149-50 (SEC Feb. 28, 1981).
[2411 See, e.g.. Dolin, supra note 213; Downing & Miller, supra note 213.
[2421 See Greene. supra note 221, at 168.
1243] See, e.g., In re Darrell L Nielson, [Accounting Releases Binder] Sec. Reg. L. Rep. (CCH)
172,297 (SEC Jan. 10, 1980) (Karmel, dissenting); Ferrara, supra note 219, at 1810-11; Greene,
supra note 221, at 169-70.
[244] See Marsh, supra note 212, at 990-93.
[2451 Id.
[246] In re Petrallia, Turk, and DiConsiglio, Securities Act Release No. 5963 (Aug. 25. 1978).
[247] Greene, supra note 221, at 169.
[248] See Ferrara, supra note 219, at 1812.
[249] 609 F.2d 570, 582 n.21 (2d Cir. 1979).
[250) See, e.g., In re Ernst & Ernst, [Accounting Releases Binder] Fed Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
572,270 (SEC May 31, 1978).
[251] [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 982,124 (SEC July 2. 1979).
[2521 See Securities Exchange Act §15(b) (4) (E), 15 U.S.C. §78o(b) (4) (E) (1976).
[2531 In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
82,124 at 81,989 (SEC July 2. 1979).
[2541 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979).
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[255] See Securities Act §19(a), 15 U.S.C. §77s(a) (1976); Securities Exchange Act Section
23(a), 15 U.S.C. §78w(a) (1976).
[256] Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d at 581.
[257] See In re Darrell L Nielson, [Accounting Releases Binder] Sec. Reg. L. Rep. (CCH)
1172,297 (SEC Jan 10, 1980) (Karmel, dissenting); In re Richard D. Hodgin, 18 SEC Docket 458
(SEC Sept. 27, 1979) (Karmel, dissenting); In re Keating, Muething & Klekanip, [1979 Transfer
Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 182,124 (SEC July 2, 1979) (Karmel, dissenting); R. Karmel.
Regulation by Prosecution (1982); Karmel, A Delicate Assignment: The Regulation of Accountants b)
the SEC, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 959 (1981); Daley & Karmel, Attorneys' Responsibilities: Adversaries at
the Bar of the SEC, 24 Emory L.J. 747 (1975).
[258] Securities Act §19(a), 15 U.S.C. §77s(a) (1976); Securities Exchange Act 13(b) (1), 15
U.S.C. §78m(b) (1) (Supp. IV 1980).
[259] Securities Act Schedule A, Items 25-27, 15 U.S.C. §77aa Schedule A, Items 25-27 (1976);
Securities Exchange Act §§12(b) (1) (J). (K), & §13(a), 15 U.S.C. §§781(b) (1) (3), (K). & §78m(a)
(1976).
[260] [Accounting Releases Binder] See. Reg. L. Rep. (CCH) 9.72,297 (SEC Jan. 10. 1980).
[261] See, e.g., Best, In Opposition to Rule 2(e) Proceedings. 36 Bus. Law. 1815 (1981); Dolin,
supra note 213; Dowing & Miller, supra note 213.
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